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I. Introduction – A Dogmatic Approach in Domestic Law 
The last twenty years in the history of European Criminal 
Law (ECL) began with the demonstration of a dynamic de-
velopment by first labeling “traditional forms” of mutual 
cooperation in criminal matters as “European” ones, then 
subsequently beginning to elaborate on new – singular and 
independent – forms of cooperation. Simultaneously, a new 
philosophy of cooperation emerged and began gaining 
strength in the field of criminal law, which came to be fol-
lowed in present-day legislation and in applying the law. This 
philosophy reworked several “old” principles in this field – in 
a more precise manner – through the addition of new ele-
ments. Furthermore, the philosophy created new principles to 
this “European” criminal law, such that are considered to be 
inevitable and essential for the everyday functioning of this 
field of criminal law, as well as for future developments. The 
primary goal of this manuscript is to present the changing 
face of the legality principle with regard to the impacts of 
European integration on the criminal law systems. 
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, and with 
this, the regulation of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (Art. 67-89 TFEU) became part of the rules on 
European Criminal Law. 
Today there is no doubt concerning the concept of ECL: 
this branch of European law contains every legal norm issued 
on the legal basis of the third pillar and of its successor, the 
AFSJ. The counterparts of ECL rest in various sets of domes-
tic criminal law, which constantly deal with having to ac-
commodate to the impact and developments brought about by 
the European movement – in the form of “harmonized crimi-
nal law”. Establishing a definition for this new legal terrain 
was initially difficult, due to the uncertainty of the Member 
States and the political implications of the question of wheth-
er the followed approach is proper and suitable. 
By now, the basic framework of ECL has crystallized, 
and the twenty busy years of developing an originally indefi-
nite legal phenomenon have now uncovered clear paths into 
the near future of ECL. In the last ten years, the early “soft 
definitions” have toughened and the existence of “European 
Criminal Law”, whatever it might be, is no longer disputed. 
 
II. Legality 
Legality is the preeminent, most fundamental principle in 
modern criminal justice systems – and is also a pillar of the 
rule of law. Legality has played a central role in understand-
ing the rule of law in Europe. The principle is comprised of 
two interconnected maxims: nullum crimen sine lege (“[there 
exists] no crime without a pre-existing penal law establishing 
such crime”) and nulla poena sine lege (“[there exists] no 
punishment without a pre-existing penal law establishing 
such punishment”).1 
                                                 
1
 The legality principle in a procedural sense is not subject to 
discussion in this study. 
As Hall stated “the principle of legality is a summation of 
the form of all the penal laws, of what distinguishes them as 
positive laws from all other rules; and it qualifies and is pre-
supposed by everything else in penal theory.”2 Nagy, in line 
with other European scholars influenced by German doc-
trine3, distinguishes four elements of legality: 
 
 (i) non-retroactivity of unfavorable criminal law (nullum 
crimen sine lege praevia), 
 (ii) prohibition of analogy (analogia in malam partem) 
and unfavorable extensive application of law (nullum 
crimen sine lege stricta), 
 (iii) certainty (nullum crimen sine lege certa), 
 (iv) requirement of written norms in criminal law (nullum 
crimen sine lege scripta). 
 
In many legal systems, legality is considered to comprise the 
interdiction of customary criminal provisions, requiring that 
criminalization results from a written law that can be traced 
back to the legislator. Therefore, the latter element is not a 
part of the general international concept of legality. Notably 
with respect to common law states4 and international criminal 
law, none of the international conventions prohibits the appli-
cation of customary criminal law as determined by 
es.5The importance of the principle embodies the potential of 
limiting states’ power on individuals (or legal entities) in the 
very sensitive field of criminal justice and the possibility of 
offering a moral choice for individuals. As Fletcher summa-
rized: “individuals have a right to know what could make a 
moral difference in their choosing to engage in the action or 
not”6 and they have a right to know what the “law” is “at the 
time when they are said to violate it.”7 
On the European level, the principle of legal certainty has 
not yet been defined either in primary or in secondary law; it 
is classified as a general principle based on ECJ case law. 
The answer as to what is meant by the principle of legal cer-
tainty in EU law8 may vary depending on the methods and 
                                                 
2
 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. 1960, 
Reprint 2005, p. 27. 
3
 Gropp, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed. 2015, § 3 pa-
ra. A; see also Gellér, Legality on Trial, 2002, p. 37 ff. Re-
garding Hungarian developments Nagy/Szomora, in: Jakab/ 
Tatham/Takács (eds.), Transformation of Hungarian Legal 
Order 1985-2005, 2007, p. 193. 
4
 See further Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 1995, 
p. 59 ff. 
5
 Kreß, in: Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, 7. Band, 2012, Nulla poena nullum 
crimen sine lege, para. 899-908; see also The Manifesto on 
European Criminal Policy by the European Criminal Policy 
Initiative. First published in ZIS 2009, 707. 
6
 Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 1998, p. 13. 
7
 Fletcher (fn. 6), p. 213. 
8
 For this paper, the use of “EU law” also covers the former 
Community law. 
The legality of criminal law and the new competences of the TFEU 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik – www.zis-online.com 
  25 
viewpoints chosen. According to Raitio,9 in Community law, 
the principle refers to the principle of non-retroactivity, pro-
tection of legitimate expectations, protection of vested rights, 
issues of procedural time limits and immediate application of 
law, as well as the use of comprehensible language in the 
administration of the Community. However, “EU member-
ship has created a situation in which the State is no longer the 
only source of legality. Apart from other factors (such as the 
development of the Welfare State aimed at protecting citizens 
from welfare risks), it is the multiplicity of legal orders 
claiming simultaneous validity and application that has argu-
ably contributed to the diminished role of the principle of 
legality”10. 
Examining legal certainty as projected onto the domain of 
criminal law, a connection between the two is evident in the 
principle of legality.11 Therefore, an unavoidable and neces-
sary consequence of the general acceptance of the legal cer-
tainty principle is that it strengthens the criminal law aspect 
of certainty, i.e. legality. This principle is also laid down in 
Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), as no 
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal of-
fense under national law or international law at the time when 
it was committed. The rule – similarly to the national legal 
(and fundamental rights) framework – contains as many 
components as required. One of these is the nullum 
crimen/nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria component. In 
domestic legal systems, the traditional legal structures and 
legal development constitute 
 
 (i) either the need for parliamentary legislation in criminal 
matters or 
 (ii) that the legislator should abstain from regulation. 
 
However, in most European countries lex parlamentaria is 
required to regulate criminal law. On the European level, the 
exclusivity of lex parlamentaria is not conceivable, due to the 
unique and original legislative matrix and to the different 
meaning of democratic legitimacy12 in the Union. Nonethe-
less, true democratic functioning is the essential facet of this 
system, even if democracy may – at least partially – have 
other requirements. As stated in the Manifesto: 
 
                                                 
9
 Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, 2003, 
p. 382. 
10
 Besselink/Pennings/Prechal, The Eclipse of the Legality 
Principle in the European Union, 2011, p. 4. 
11
 In Hungary for example: The Fundamental Law of Hunga-
ry, Art. XXVIII, para. 4 sets forth the principle of legality as 
follows: “No one shall be held guilty of or be punished for an 
act which at the time when it was committed did not consti-
tute a criminal offence under Hungarian law or, within the 
scope specified in an international treaty or a legal act of the 
European Union, under the law of another State.” 
12
 Szilágyi, Kitekintö 1996, 95; Schmidt, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 2004, 975. 
“In order to achieve a satisfactory level of democratic le-
gitimacy in regard of secondary legislation with criminal 
law implications, and to ensure wide acceptance of such 
measures, the institutions involved in the legislative pro-
cess must make sure that the national Parliaments are in-
formed in any case (also now after the changes provided 
for by the Lisbon Treaty have come into effect) as early 
and as thoroughly as possible. This will enable the Mem-
ber States to actually influence the final form and content 
of the instruments (and the voting of their representatives 
in the Council). Before legislative decisions are made, an 
equal co-operation between the Member States and the 
European institutions and among Member States is neces-
sary for installing a sufficient level of democratic con-
trol.”13 
 
III. European Criminal Law Legislation and Legality 
In the realm of the legality principle, the question may arise 
as to under which “domestic or international law”14 the above 
provision of the Charter of Fundamental Rights demands, and 
under what type of interpretation it may be enforced in EU 
law itself. EU law comprises international legal norms (e.g. 
treaties), and considering the international legal characteris-
tics of EU law, it shall not be ruled out that this provision – if 
relevant – be applied to EU norms as well. Could punisha-
bilty according to EU law in itself be enough for the enforce-
ability of legality? In connection with this, a significant issue 
has arisen with regard to the sustainability of indirect crimi-
nal legal responsibility deriving from EU law. Aside from all 
of this, the Charter further provides a broad meaning to the 
principle of legality in that compared to punishability accord-
ing to internal, Member States law, (the EU) requirement 
provides for optional application of punishability according 
to international law. 
The nulla poena sine lege principle can gain significance 
in the “area of freedom, security, and justice”, in the realm of 
legislation effecting shared competence. As such, for exam-
ple, this could not be a point of reference in cases where in 
one Member State, a final verdict is brought in a criminal 
procedure, which, in comparison to if criminal proceedings 
were to have been initiated in another Member State, a more 
lenient punishment would have awaited the accused. This 
provision cannot be enforced for the prohibition of the nebis 
in idem principle (and the enforcement of this upon Member 
States regulations). 
The prerequisites of legality anchored truly in criminal 
law shall be fulfilled at the level of the EU law if the Union 
will use its divisions of ius puniendi.15 The use of the powers 
                                                 
13
 Ibid fn. 5 – Manifesto I Sect. 4c. 
14
 For example, “which did not constitute a criminal offence 
under national law or international law” and “nach innerstaat-
lichem oder internationalem Recht nicht strafbar war”. 
15
 The notion itself is a broad concept and comprises a bundle 
of (several) competences in criminal law which are generally 
applied in domestic criminal law (particularly in continental 
legal families; see more in Packer, The Limits of Criminal 
Sanctions, 1986, p. 19 ff.), while others are determinative for 
Krisztina Karsai 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ZIS 1/2016 
26 
defined by the TFEU has different consequences for postulat-
ing legality. 
The principle of legality sets certain demands both in 
terms of legislation and administration of justice, and also 
introduces prohibitions. 
Only two of the above mentioned and herein acknowl-
edged aspects of legality (lex scripta and lex certa) oblige the 
legislator by enforcing the principle at the European level. 
Despite the already mentioned characteristics of international 
criminal law, EU law in criminal matters cannot work with-
out formal regulations, e.g. written norms. The accepted non-
written sources of European law (the general principles them-
selves and the few rules of international public law) are not 
able to establish and “carve out” ECL content (ius puniendi, 
aspects of responsibility, sanctions, etc.). Therefore, it can be 
stated that in the case of issuing legal acts defined by the 
TFEU and the respective Community competences, the lex 
scripta requirement is fulfilled by the European legislator. 
The second adhesive condicio sine qua non is the lex cer-
ta requirement, which might often be (or assumed to be) 
interfered with if the EU uses its divisions of ius puniendi – 
in particular that of the “power to define”. In the case of 
directives, the process of domestic implementation ensures 
the required degree of certainty (etc.), the European norm 
does not dispose of the same degree of legality as the national 
criminal legal norm. 
Despite this, it is possible that the directive contains not 
only the regulatory aims (i.e. it obliges the MS to achieve 
certain results, but leaves them freedom to determine the 
means), but it is issued setting forth clear definitions, without 
leaving any margin of appreciation for the national legislators 
of MS. In this case, e.g. if the European legislator used its 
                                                                                    
the framework of international criminal law. The question of 
international ius puniendi has arisen in connection with inter-
national crimes, with the universal jurisdiction in criminal 
matters, with the criminal responsibility of individuals upon 
international law and with the existence of the supranational 
criminal tribunals. See more in Nyitrai, Nemzetközi és euró-
pai büntetőjog, 2006; Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 
1999. In a domestic (national) context, in my opinion, ius 
puniendi means the public power to punish: a) the power to 
choose: choice between values and interests which should be 
protected (“whether to punish”); b) the power to use criminal 
law: decision to use power to punish in order to protect 
above-mentioned values or interests (“why to punish”); c) the 
power to define crime and punishment in two aspects: aa) on 
the one hand, the decision about the threshold of protection 
(what is punishable behavior and “normal” behavior); and the 
decision about other prerequisites of punishment (age, justifi-
cation, excuse etc.) in close connection with the former 
(“what to punish”); and, on the other hand, bb) decision about 
the limitations of punishment; d) the power to be severe: 
decision about the severity of the punishment, choice be-
tween (theoretically infinite) possibilities of punishment 
(“how to punish”); e) the power execute punishment: perfor-
mance of punishment, i.e. the entire process of penal execu-
tion. 
“power to define”, the same requirements of legality shall be 
met as if the MS’s legislator would have exercised such 
“power” under domestic criminal law. Also the eventual 
normative framework created via regulations shall bear close 
resemblance with this method of legislation. In case of 
framework decisions already in effect, this issue concerning 
“power to define” is also apparent, but without any implica-
tion of direct application, as will be evidenced later. 
 
“Although the subsidiary character of harmonisation work 
at EU-level necessarily requires that the Member States 
have a certain degree of latitude in drafting the details of 
implementation (which implies a certain degree of vague-
ness as regards European legislative acts), the lex certa 
requirement is nevertheless important for EU legal in-
struments as a general principle of law and a fundamental 
element of any criminal law system based on the rule of 
law. The smaller the margin of freedom at the level of 
implementation, the more important it is that the Europe-
an legislative acts satisfy the lex certa requirement. If a 
certain European legal instrument seeks to fully harmo-
nise the proscriptions in the Member States, it should sat-
isfy the lex certa requirement in the same way as if it were 
a criminal law provision.”16 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ17 clearly pointed out that framework 
decisions shall not meet the threshold set by the legality prin-
ciple under Member States law. In the case of Advocatenvoor 
de Wereld, the question was nothing of lesser importance 
than whether the regulation of “catalogue-offences”18 in the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant shall 
meet the standards set by the certainty requirement, with 
regard to criminal legality. The ratio decidendi was based on 
                                                 
16
 Ibid fn. 5 – Manifesto I Sect. 1c. 
17
 Many times, the ECJ had the opportunity to decide on 
references for preliminary ruling concerning underlying crim-
inal procedures. In these decisions the principle of legality 
was oftentimes mentioned thus granted with a kind of “Euro-
pean validity”. It is important to note that the ECJ did/does 
not apply criminal law in these cases, it is merely entitled 
(and obliged) to interpret the rules of the EU law even in 
cases where the preliminary question arises in connection 
with domestic criminal procedure. Through the several deci-
sions of the ECJ that I mention herein, I do not intend to 
focus on the general legal principles of the EU law, I only 
direct my attention to the principle of legality in connection 
with criminal law, when relevant. 
18
 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, OJ EU 2002 
No. L 190, p.1, on the European arrest warrant and the sur-
render procedures between Member States. The offences 
listed in Art. 2 (herein referred to as “catalogue-offences”) 
give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant, 
without verification of the double criminality of the act, if 
they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodi-
al sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years and as they are defined by the law of the 
issuing Member State. 
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the unavoidable necessity of implementation and also the 
exclusion of any direct application of a framework decision. 
 
“The Framework Decision does not seek to harmonize the 
criminal offences in question in respect of their constitu-
ent elements or of the penalties which they attract. […] It 
follows that, in so far as it dispenses with verification of 
the requirement of double criminality in respect of the of-
fences listed in that provision, Article 2(2) of the Frame-
work Decision is not invalid on the ground that it infring-
es the principle of the legality of criminal offences and 
penalties.”19 
 
This might be true, but the picture is more colorful on the 
level of the MS through the implementation of vague con-
cepts in connection with listed offenses (labeled as “cartoons 
of the statutory elements of any offenses”20). There are coun-
tries where the implementation was carried out with a simple 
takeover of the opaque catalogue of the framework decision, 
and others which implemented the list by establishing direct 
connections to national statutory offenses (e.g. Hungary). 
How the principle of legality (in Member States terms) could 
be enforced in such a different legal ambiance shall be sub-
ject to further comparative research. 
As already stated, the ECJ was very clear with regard to 
the acceptance of legality, already in its initial decisions, as 
early as 1996, as the following example illustrates. 
 
“Where it is necessary to determine the extent of liability 
in criminal law arising under legislation adopted for the 
specific purpose of implementing a directive, the princi-
ple that a provision of the criminal law may not be ap-
plied extensively to the detriment of the defendant, which 
is the corollary of the principle of legality in relation to 
crime and punishment and more generally of the principle 
of legal certainty, precludes bringing criminal proceed-
ings in respect of conduct not clearly defined as culpable 
by law.”21 
 
IV. Application of European Criminal Law 
1. Basics 
If we look for the implications of the legality principle on the 
level of the administration of justice (i.e. in relevant jurispru-
dence), the first important distinction shall be made concern-
ing the addressee of the inflicting demands of the legality in 
criminal law. The Union itself cannot – yet – enforce criminal 
law; it does not exercise the “power to execute”. Enforcement 
of EU law (in this regard) is a duty of the courts of the MS. 
This means that national criminal courts (and constitutional 
courts) shall apply and interpret the norms of EU law, where 
relevant. Which norms of EU law with criminal law content 
                                                 
19
 ECJ, Judgment of 3.5.2007 – C-303/05 (Advocaten voor de 
Wereld VZW), ECR I-3633, 52 ff. 
20
 Hefendehl, ZIS 2006, 231. 
21
 ECJ, Judgment of 12.12.1996 – C-74/95, C-129/95 (Crimi-
nal proceedings against X), ECR I-6609. 
can gain legal force in the legal order of MS, through applica-
tion in national criminal procedures, and if so, how exactly? 
In relation to this dilemma, the following distinction shall be 
clarified: 
 
 There are cases where the direct application of EU law 
norms by the national criminal court is necessary, and 
 There are cases where the decisive factor is the indirect 
effect of EU law norms that leads the court to depart from 
its previous jurisprudence and re-interpret the regulatory 
content of national norms in accordance with EU law. 
 
Obviously these instances have different legal character, but 
their common feature is the combination of national vs. Eu-
ropean level of legislation, application and interpretation of 
law. Theoretically, the principle of legality could surface 
under both scenarios. In the first above described case, the 
eventual recognition of lex stricta and lex scripta rooted in 
EU law will take place in the national criminal procedure. 
The second one is the “infamous” legal consequence of Eu-
ropean integration; however, in this case it can be traced how 
the influence of EU law norms affects the interpretation of 
principles rooted in national law. During the layout of re-
search findings, special attention will be given to the lex 
praevia rule and its European context. 
 
2. Lex mitior 
Before plunging into the depths of academic debate, the lex 
praevia aspect needs to be mentioned, i.e. the non-
retroactivity of unfavorable criminal law (lex mitior) and the 
requirement of pre-existing regulation before the perpetration 
of a criminal act or the imposition of a sanction. 
The lex mitior principle is recognized by all Member 
States, but there are differences with regard to its normative 
status, especially pertaining to the question of whether the 
principle is of a constitutional character. The ECJ held in 
1983 that “non-retroactivity of penal provisions is common to 
all the Member States and enshrined in Art. 7 of the ECHR. It 
is one of the general principles of EC law.”22 However we 
may recall that the ECJ repeatedly held that 
 
“the principle of legal certainty requires that a regulation 
should not be applied retroactively, regardless of whether 
such an application might produce favorable or unfavora-
ble effects for the person concerned, unless a sufficiently 
clear indication can be found either in the terms of the 
regulation or in its stated objectives which allows the 
conclusion to be drawn that the regulation was not merely 
providing for the future”.23 
 
This interpretation was upheld as the Court stated that (i) EU 
law does not contain any principle equivalent to that of im-
                                                 
22
 ECJ, Judgment of 20.4.1983 – Case 63/83 (Regina/Kent 
Kirk), ECR 1984, 2689. 
23
 ECJ, Judgment of 29.1.1985 – Case 234/83 (Gesamthoch-
schule Duisburg vs. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte), ECR 
327, 20. 
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mediate application of the more lenient criminal provisions 
(lex mitior), and that (ii) in the absence of rules to harmonize 
penalties for breach of Community law, it is up to the domes-
tic legal system of each Member State to determine them. 
The Court nonetheless considers that the Community-law 
principle of equivalence does not preclude breaches of Com-
munity law from being penalized under substantive and pro-
cedural conditions analogous to those applicable to infringe-
ments of national law of a similar nature and importance.24 
Nonetheless, as regards implications for criminal law, 
there is a need to underline their specificity; the retroactive 
application of the more lenient penalty was also confirmed by 
the Court as part of the common constitutional heritage of the 
MS: 
 
“It follows that this principle must be regarded as forming 
part of the general principles of Community law which 
national courts must respect when applying the national 
legislation adopted for the purpose of implementing 
Community law and, more particularly in the present cas-
es, the directives on company law.”25 
 
Moreover, in Goicoechea, the avocat general Kokott empha-
sized another important element of lex praevia: 
 
“The principle does not apply to the procedural aspects of 
criminal law. A person may thus have applied to him pro-
cedural provisions introduced or amended after the date of 
the offence he is charged with without the principle nul-
lum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia being 
breached.”26 
 
We shall not fail to point out – as it is also relevant – that in 
this regard, it is not the “mere labeling” of the norm by the 
legislator that is determinative, but the objective targeted by 
the norm is a more relevant factor, if the rule – which might 
be set forth in a procedural code – contains substantive re-
quirements of criminal responsibility (or of punishment), that 
must be considered as pertinent to the lex praevia, where 
relevant.27 Further implications of the lexpraevia requirement 
are highlighted below. 
                                                 
24
 See more in Opinion of avocet general Léger delivered on 
16 July 1998 (Case C-230/97, Criminal proceedings against 
Ibiyinka A woyemi [1998], ECR I-06781). 
25
 ECJ, Judgment of 3.5.2005 – C-387/02, C-391/02, C-
403/02 (Criminal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi, 
Sergio Adelchi, Marcello Dell’Utri and others), ECR I-3565, 
68 f. 
26
 View of avocet general Kokott delivered on 6 August 2008 
(C-296/08 PPU, Extradition proceedings against Ignacio 
Pedro Santesteban Goicoechea. [2008], ECR I-06307, 45). 
27
 The domestic doctrinal differentiating between substantive 
or procedural requirements of the criminal responsibility 
might diverge in the different Member States of the Union, 
for example the consequences of the statute of limitation. In 
Germany, the postponing enlargement of the necessary peri-
od for the statute of limitation does not fall under the ban of 
3. Legality and Direct Effect 
Definition of clear rules allows for the option of the direct 
application of directives due to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
The issue of direct application/effect of EU law with criminal 
law content is not a simple one. A directive has vertical direct 
effect once the deadline for implementation has passed; in 
this case a person (be it natural or legal) may rely on the text 
against a Member State in court. The ECJ has established28 
several conditions so that an individual may be able to refer 
to a directive before the courts, specifically: 
 
 (i) if the provisions of a directive are unconditional and 
sufficiently precise, and 
 (ii) if the directive has not yet been or not correctly im-
plemented by the pre-determined deadline. 
 
This means first of all, that the direct application of EU law 
directives with criminal law content needs to meet the thresh-
old established by the content of the (national) legality prin-
ciple, because in the case of applying the provisions of a 
directive in a domestic criminal procedure, the directive be-
comes part of the criminal law framework only in relation to 
the disputed issue of fact or law. Theoretically, the same is 
true for regulations, therefore the requirement of civil law 
systems for written penal provisions is fulfilled, and the court 
is bound to those as well. Furthermore, this legal construction 
initially excludes the possibility of introducing customary or 
judge-made law (lex scripta) in criminal procedures. 
The lex stricta aspect of legality contains the prohibition 
of unfavorable analogy. This, however, cannot be applied, 
not even in the case of comparable EU law norms due to the 
fact that there is no special European (legal) interest which 
could overwrite the traditional meaning of legality. 
However, in comparing EU law requirements and the 
principle of legality, a genuine European limitation can be 
detected in terms of direct application of EU law with crimi-
nal law implications, one that is not covered by the herein 
detailed and reaffirmed four aspects of legality. It can also be 
labeled as an exception from applying written (criminal) law, 
even though there is statutory law in effect. This is the one 
aspect of the direct application of directives, where only the 
person concerned may rely on the directive exclusively in 
order to gain legal advantage with regard to adjudication. 
Projecting it on criminal law, the ECJ stated: 
 
“A national authority may not rely, as against an individ-
ual upon a provision of a directive whose necessary im-
                                                                                    
retroactivity (see Lenckner/Eser/Stree/Eisele/Heine/Perron/ 
Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 
Kommentar, 29th ed. 2014, § 2 para. 1, 42), whereas it does in 
Hungary (see Nagy, A magyar büntetőjog általános része, 
2010, p. 183 f.). Though the probability of any preliminary 
ruling is rather rare concerning this issue, it could have a 
unification effect with regard to the interpretation of Art. 49 
CFR. 
28
 In particular: ECJ, Judgment of 19.1.1982 – 8/81 (Becker 
vs. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt), ECR 1982, 53. 
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plementation in national law has not yet taken place. In 
applying its national legislation, a court of a member state 
is required to interpret that legislation in the light of the 
wording and the purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 189 of the Treaty but a directive cannot, of itself and 
independently of a law adopted for its implementation, 
have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability 
in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the 
provisions of that directive.”29 
 
In 1982, express ius puniendi was not imaginable as a deter-
minative power of the Community; therefore, it was almost 
necessary to exclude any form of interpretation touching 
upon issues surrounding criminal responsibility. Today, di-
rectives can be issued on the authority of Art. 82, 83 TFEU, 
just as directives and regulations under Art. 325 TFEU within 
the scope of the EU’s “power to define” (i.e. a split of ius 
puniendi). 
 
a) Legislation on Minimum Rules 
In the case of directives under Art. 82 or 83 TFEU, the aim of 
the EU is to establish de minimis rules with respect to defini-
tions of criminal offenses and sanctions in the areas of partic-
ularly serious crimes that usually have a cross-border dimen-
sion resulting from the nature or impact of such offenses or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis. 
Issuing a directive, the Union can define the minimum statu-
tory elements of certain offenses and the minimum rules for 
the imposition of sanctions. 
In the possible direct application of principles aimed at 
criminal responsibility, the most important question is how 
this can be effectively applied in criminal proceedings, and 
how the legal status of the person concerned – the person 
under prosecution – is affected by direct application. This is 
dependent upon what the regulative minimums – which the 
state did not or did not properly integrate into its own legal 
system – pertained to exactly. In this analysis, several factors 
must be considered: 
 
 Whether the EU minimum affects the positive or nega-
tive element of criminal responsibility 
 Whether the national law (without amendments/or 
brought into effect without appropriate transposition) 
contains responsibility more or less stringent in compari-
son to the directive 
 In certain cases, whether there is an explicit directive 
prohibiting criminalization (perhaps prohibition that can 
be expanded through legal interpretation) 
 In certain cases, whether the directive provides room for 
discretion. 
 
In my opinion, from the combined impact of these factors, 
the following situations could arise (Table 1, p. 37). 
                                                 
29
 ECJ, Judgment of 8.10.1987 – Case 80/86 (Criminal pro-
ceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV), ECR 1987, 
3969. 
If minimum rules are absent from the domestic criminal 
code, the above mentioned European limitation restricts the 
consequences of relying on the directive, namely EU law on 
its own cannot establish (or aggravate) criminal responsibility 
in the context of a national criminal procedure. The special 
structure of criminal law (e.g. prohibitions) and the non-
exclusionary competence of the Union in the field of ECL 
have placed minimum-regulation into a special legal frame-
work. If the directive – as a norm of orientation about what 
shall be punishable at least – only contains minimum stand-
ards and the Member States did not implement these or did, 
albeit, not properly – then the person affected cannot obtain a 
favorable or an advantageous legal position by relying on the 
directive. Namely, the minimum elements of statutory of-
fenses offered by the EU law norm are not to establish the 
threshold for non-punishing i.e. the upper limit (cap) of pun-
ishability. The Commission defines the minimum rules on 
offenses as follows: 
 
“the definition of the offences, i.e. the description of con-
duct considered to be criminal, always covers the conduct 
of the main perpetrator but also in most cases ancillary 
conduct such as instigating, aiding and abetting. In some 
cases, the attempt to commit the offence is also covered. 
All EU criminal law instruments include in the definition 
intentional conduct, but in some cases also seriously neg-
ligent conduct. Some instruments further define what 
should be considered as “aggravating” or “mitigating” cir-
cumstances for the determination of the sanction in a par-
ticular case. 
Generally, EU legislation covers offences committed by 
natural persons as well as by legal persons such as com-
panies or associations. The latter can be important in 
many areas, e.g. concerning responsibility for oil spills. 
However, in existing legislation, Member States have al-
ways been left with the choice concerning the type of lia-
bility of legal persons for the commission of criminal of-
fences, as the concept of criminal liability of legal persons 
does not exist in all national legal orders30 
 
One might argue that the regulatory level of ECL – fortunate-
ly – is far from that applied in the MS; i.e. this means that the 
EU is not entitled to design the absolute thresholds of crimi-
nal responsibility in an exclusionary manner. Therefore, 
where directives contain minimum regulation (of statutory 
elements), it is then not possible to directly apply this, be-
cause it would be unreasonable in comparison to the existing 
Member States criminal framework. 
                                                 
30
 Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council. The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 20.9.2011, 
Towards an EU Criminal Policy, Ensuring the effective im-
plementation of EU policies through criminal law, COM 
(2011) 573 final, p. 9. 
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The EU source of law on trafficking of human being pro-
vides a specific regulatory example,31 in which Art. 2 para. 4 
states that “the consent of a victim of trafficking in human 
beings to the exploitation, whether intended or actual, shall 
be irrelevant, where any of the means set forth in paragraph 1 
has been used.” Here, dogmatic questions about the relevance 
of the consent of the victim are not part of the subject of the 
investigation, therefore in this sense, it is worth emphasizing 
that in the case of violence (force) effecting the free will of 
the victim, consent of the victim inherently cannot be taken 
into consideration, but a majority of the listed circumstances 
are such that consent could be legally effective (with regard 
to the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator). This is what 
the directive precludes, and thus, in comparison to all such 
Member States regulation that provides some sort of “miti-
gating” sanction for consent of the victim shall be considered 
more stringent, and thus, in the absence of transposition can-
not be applied directly. 
An example of the second main category shall follow: in 
the case of child pornography,32Art. 5 para. 7 and 8 of the 
Directive set forth that Member States have the discretion to 
decide whether or not to criminalize cases involving child 
pornography where the person on the pornographic material 
appears to be a child, but is in fact over 18 years of age; and 
furthermore, in cases where the recording was produced and 
is possessed solely for private use. The Hungarian Criminal 
Code does not punish the former, but as for the latter, under 
§ 204 of the Criminal Code it is merely factual, as the pur-
pose of production or possession is immaterial. However, in 
this case the directive regulation clearly states that here, MS 
have free discretion in deciding punishability, thus the effect-
ed persons would not be able to rely on “improper” transposi-
tion. 
A different type of constellation is evident in the regula-
tion of illicit drug trafficking33 Art. 2 para. 2 provides exclu-
sion from the scope of the Framework Decision if the con-
duct involving production, cultivation, etc. is committed by 
the perpetrator exclusively for personal use. Assuming that 
the framework decision will soon be replaced by a directive, 
in which the exclusion would remain, then in cases where the 
conduct involved (production for) personal consumption, the 
question could arise as to whether for Member States punish-
ability, the perpetrator could rely on “improper” transposition 
and “extort” unpunishablity. Based on interpretation of the 
                                                 
31
 Directive 2011/36/EU of 6.4.2011, OJ EU 2011 No. 101/1, 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA. 
32
 Directive 2011/92/EU of 13.12.2011, OJ EU 2011 No. L 
26, on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
33
 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 5.10.2004 
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements 
of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug traf-
ficking. 
text, it does not extend to cover material scope, and thus does 
not collide with EU expectations. 
Minimum-regulation does not mean such a strict regula-
tion, compared to which MS-level differences would not be 
permitted – as can be seen in the above summary. Because of 
the above, it can also be said that the indirect effect of direc-
tives will be less likely to prevail in the case of criminal law 
regulation, since the limitations are narrowed by two sources: 
limitations from both European law and criminal law prevail. 
Although in the above – moving ahead a bit – I assumed 
it to be evidenced that, in connection with other conditions of 
criminal responsibility, the question must be answered as to 
whether these are contained in the above conceptual scope of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and 
thus can, for example, legal age of punishability, illegali-
ty/provisions on grounds for exemption from criminal re-
sponsibility, statutory limitations, the concept of threat (etc.) 
can be subject to minimum-regulation. 
If broadly interpreted, the indirect effect application of the 
directive may be exposed, the enforcement of punishability 
limitation not known in national law may bring about favora-
ble change in the legal situation of the person undergoing 
criminal proceedings 
If narrowly interpreted, only specific description of con-
duct could be brought into the scope of the term of “facts” in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the approximation 
of law could only be applied to the scope of the special part. 
This in itself could be correct. However, in many cases the 
“facts” of the directives define separate punishability limita-
tions for certain scopes of crime. Additionally, they also 
contain general part regulations (complicity, stages). These 
are all contrary to narrow interpretation, even if from the 
Member States perspective, the tendency would be to follow 
this. 
 
b) Legislation on Minimum Sanctions 
This situation is also true of minimum rules of sanctioning 
established by a directive under Arts. 82 or 83 of the TFEU. 
Setting the minimum standards does not prohibit the imposi-
tion of other or more severe sanctions, and it shall also be 
obvious that an eventual reliance of a private person on a 
non-implemented directive cannot amount to a favorable 
procedural standing in respect of minimum sanctions. Ac-
cording to the Commission: 
 
“Regarding sanctions, EU criminal law can require Mem-
ber States to take effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal sanctions for a specific conduct. Effectiveness 
requires that the sanction is suitable to achieve the desired 
goal, i.e. observance of the rules; proportionality requires 
that the sanction must be commensurate with the gravity 
of the conduct and its effects and must not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the aim; and dissuasiveness requires 
that the sanctions constitute an adequate deterrent for po-
tential future perpetrators. Sometimes, EU criminal law 
determines more specifically, which types and/or levels of 
sanctions are to be made applicable. Provisions concern-
ing confiscation can also be included. It is not the primary 
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goal of an EU-wide approximation to increase the respec-
tive sanction levels applicable in the Member States but 
rather to reduce the degree of variation between the na-
tional systems and to ensure that the requirements of “ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions are in-
deed met in all Member States.”34 
 
If we ask ourselves why specifically minimum sanctions are 
included in the Commission’s communication, it becomes 
clear that the objective is to unify protections: similar values 
shall be protected in (almost) similar ways, but not below the 
threshold defined by the EU (the majority of MS). Prima 
facie, such regulation might be convincing, but the oversight 
of this regulation can be detected without difficulty. If the 
minimum level is set as equivalent to the MS-minimums 
already in place, then the instrument will add – to put it deli-
cately – “a big nothing” to the system of protections.35 If, 
however, the EU minimum threshold is set above the existing 
minimum threshold within the MS, this indeed provides add-
ed value. On the other hand, this does not amount to a favor-
able trend in my view, because it can be argued that this will 
result in an increased level of repression throughout Europe. 
In connection with the consequences of mutual recogni-
tion, an increase in repression would be capable of “trauma-
tizing” the national systems of criminal law, and of bringing 
about several disturbances or dysfunctions in domestic 
frameworks. 
However, one field does exist, in which these suggestions 
are valid, although in an opposing manner: it remains unclear 
from the dogmatic approaches examined whether other re-
quirements of criminal responsibility (required legal age of 
punishability for any offense in the directive; grounds of 
justification or excuse; rules on statute of limitation; etc.) 
belong to the statutory elements of an offence under national 
law, on top of the statutorily forbidden conduct. In case of a 
broad interpretation, the possibility of (a favorable) direct 
application of a directive is open, since in case of these said 
statutory elements – if they are at all defined as such – the EU 
law norm would offer circumstances for mitigating or erasing 
criminal responsibility. In connection with these elements, 
favorable reliance of a person on the directive could become 
a legal reality. On the contrary, as a first step, I hereby argue 
for a narrow interpretation (i.e. that statutory elements of an 
offence should not include other requirements of criminal 
responsibility), since it would allow for a bigger enthusiasm 
on the part of MS to accept such norms, if they are not ob-
structed by the EU law norm in applying Member States 
criminal law untouched by aforementioned minimum legisla-
tion. It would be better if the “traumatization” of national 
criminal laws through such directives would progress at a 
slower pace. Having allowed enough time to pass, we might 
be able to see how national criminal laws can adapt to and 
survive a reality interwoven with directives relevant to crimi-
nal law. Only then would I support the application of a broad 
                                                 
34
 Ibid. fn. 30 p. 9. 
35
 Asp, The Importance of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Coherence in the Development of EU EuCLR 2011/1, p. 50. 
interpretation, enabling the next phase of criminal law inte-
gration to begin. 
However, no similar minimum standards can be discov-
ered under Art. 325 para. 4 of the TFEU. This means that if 
the European legislator will issue the necessary measures 
(directive or regulation) preventing and combating fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Union, the TFEU itself 
allows the creation of criminal standards and even the enact-
ment of a relevant directive or regulation. In this case, the 
eventual restrictions which flow from the special character of 
the minimum-legislation and from the required implementa-
tion will not establish original, sui generis limitations coun-
tering the use of ius puniendi at the EU level. Recently the 
ECJ has stated this interpretation with its new judgement in 
Ivo Taricco and Others case.36 
 
4. Legality and Indirect Effect 
A distinguished legal phenomenon of European legal integra-
tion is the indirect effect of EU law norms, which leads to the 
judicial interpretation of national norms in accordance with 
EU law.37 This is the principle and obligation of conforming 
interpretation (or of “harmonious interpretation” cf. de Búr-
ca) which is of particular importance regarding directives and 
– yet existing – framework decisions. As the ECJ stated in 
Pupino: 
 
“the obligation on the national court to refer to the content 
of a framework decision when interpreting the relevant 
rules of its national law is limited by general principles of 
law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity. In particular, those principles prevent that 
obligation from leading to the criminal liability of persons 
who contravene the provisions of a framework decision 
from being determined or aggravated on the basis of such 
a decision alone, independently of an implementing law. 
The obligation on the national court to refer to the content 
of a framework decision when interpreting the relevant 
rules of its national law ceases when the latter cannot re-
ceive an application which would lead to a result compat-
ible with that envisaged by that framework decision.”38 
 
In order to properly analyze whether and how legality can be 
examined in the case of indirect effect, the following aspects 
shall be examined. What are the temporal requirements for 
indirect effect and which legal acts of EU law are granted 
such indirect effect? What does it mean if the interpretation 
of a criminal norm changes and what might be the conse-
quences of such change? And finally, could the changing EU 
law result in a changing interpretation of national criminal 
                                                 
36
 Judgment of 8.9.2015 – Case C-105/14.  
37
 Leading judgment: ECJ, Judgment of 10.4.1984 – Case 
14/83 (Von Colson and Kamman vs. Land Nordrhein Westfa-
len), ECR 1984, 1891. In-depth analysis in Craig/de Búrca, 
EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed. 2011, p. 200 ff. 
38
 ECJ, Judgment of 16.6.2005 – C-105/03 (Criminal pro-
ceedings against Maria Pupino), ECR I-5285, 41 ff. 
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law, and does the latter impact the prohibition of retroactivi-
ty? 
 
a) Temporal (and formal) Requirements of Indirect Effect 
In the re-structuring of the Union, the FD was abolished from 
among the legal acts and as for the still effective ones, a tar-
geted legislation process has been started, through which the 
Commission intends to replace every FD with directives. 
Until the end of this process, an FD continues to bind the 
Member States and they can be relied on as presented above. 
The ECJ, in Pupino, constitutes the indirect effect of a FD 
similarly to that of directives. This judgment predicted the 
direction of the development of ECL already in 2005. None-
theless, the direct effect (similar to that of directives) was not 
extended for FD; hence, the direct application of FD was 
expressly excluded under Art. 34 para. 2 Nr. b (ex) TEU. 
Despite this, one question remains, namely, what is the legal 
nature of directives and FD before the deadline for their im-
plementation expires. This question is of essential importance 
in the scope of obliging MS to interpret their own national 
norms in the light of EU law. 
Directives and FD enter into force on the day of their pub-
lication in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) or 
on a later date as defined by the directive/FD itself (e.g. it 
shall enter into force on the twentieth day following publica-
tion). These legal acts shall also contain rules on transposi-
tion or implementation which sets the exact deadline for the 
enactment of Member States legislation in compliance with 
the content of these legal acts; real-life practice is very color-
ful – such deadlines might vary between one year to five 
years39 or more, depending on the expected difficulties of the 
implementation process. These legal acts shall bring the 
Member States legislator to issue the implementing norms or 
to amend the existing legal framework if it is necessary for 
the completion of requirements which flow from EU law. If 
the transposition deadline expires, the direct application of 
the directive opens; meanwhile, it is also clear that the indi-
rect effect of both directives and FD is acknowledged and 
enforced by the ECJ.  
Prima facie, we might be of the opinion that these sec-
ondary norms do not have a substantial effect on the national 
administration of justice (only on national legislation) during 
the implementation period. However, this is not the case. The 
ECJ unveiled important aspects of this issue step by step, and 
recognized some important factors. The ECJ has made it 
clear that directives may have an impact even before the 
implementation period has passed. In 1997, Inter-Environne-
ment Wallonie held: 
“[A] directive has legal effect with respect to the Member 
State to which it is addressed from the moment of its noti-
fication. […] Since the purpose of such a period [for im-
plementation] is, in particular, to give Member States the 
necessary time to adopt transposition measures, they can-
not be faulted for not having transposed the directive into 
                                                 
39
 E.g. in case of the 2001/220/JHA Council Framework 
Decision of 15.3.2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings, OJ EU No. L 082, p. 1 ff. 
their internal legal order before expiry of that period. 
Nevertheless, it is during the transposition period that the 
Member States must take the measures necessary to en-
sure that the result prescribed by the directive is achieved 
at the end of that period. Although the Member States are 
not obliged to adopt those measures before the end of the 
period prescribed for transposition, it follows from the 
second paragraph of Article 5 in conjunction with the 
third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty and from the 
directive itself that during that period they must refrain 
from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise 
the result prescribed. It is for the national court to assess 
whether that is the case as regards the national provisions 
whose legality it is called upon to consider. In making 
that assessment, the national court must consider, in par-
ticular, whether the provisions in issue purport to consti-
tute full transposition of the directive, as well as the ef-
fects in practice of applying those incompatible provi-
sions and of their duration in time.”40 
 
This obligation applies to all state entities, including national 
courts, which must refrain from action before the implemen-
tation period has passed from interpreting national law so as 
to prejudice the attainment of the objectives of the directive.41 
The ECJ fortified its standpoint on the issue in Mangold 
(2005): 
 
“[i]nterpretation cannot be affected by the fact that, when 
the contract in question was concluded, the period pre-
scribed for transposition into domestic law of Directive 
2000/78 had not yet expired. During the period prescribed 
for transposition of a directive, the Member States must 
refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to com-
promise the attainment of the result prescribed by that di-
rective. In this connection it is immaterial whether or not 
the rule of domestic law in question, adopted after the di-
rective entered into force, is concerned with the transposi-
tion of the directive.”42 
 
As Dannecker points out accurately: if the European legisla-
tor issues a list of certain legal concepts that should be ap-
plied in Member States law as defined by the EU legislator, 
these should indeed be considered, notwithstanding the fact 
that the implementation deadline has not yet expired. Sum-
marily, it can be concluded that relevant provisions of nation-
al law in contradiction with these aforesaid concepts, will be 
considered undesirable (unerwünscht) from the date of entry 
into force of the directive in question.43 
Lastly, Adelener (2006) shall also be mentioned at this 
point, where the ECJ summarized its jurisprudence on this 
                                                 
40
 ECJ, Judgment of 18.12.1997 – C-129/96 (Inter-
Environnement Wallonie ASBL vs. Régionwallonne), ECR I-
7411. 
41
 See more in Ibid. fn. 35. p. 43. 
42
 ECJ, Judgment of 22.11.2005 – C-144/04 (Werner Man-
gold vs. Rüdiger Helm), ECR 2005, 9981. 
43
 Dannecker, ZIS 2006, 316. 
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issue, and emphasized a further important element concern-
ing the belated transposition of the EU law norm: 
 
“In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law […] dur-
ing the period prescribed for transposition of a directive, 
the Member States to which it is addressed must refrain 
from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise 
the attainment of the result prescribed by it. In this con-
nection it is immaterial whether or not the provision of 
national law at issue which has been adopted after the di-
rective in question entered into force is concerned with 
the transposition of the directive. Given that all the au-
thorities of the Member States are subject to the obliga-
tion to ensure that provisions of Community law take full 
effect, the obligation to refrain from taking measures, as 
set out in the previous paragraph, applies just as much to 
national courts. It follows that, from the date upon which 
a directive has entered into force, the courts of the Mem-
ber States must refrain as far as possible from interpreting 
domestic law in a manner which might seriously com-
promise, after the period for transposition has expired, at-
tainment of the objective pursued by that directive.”44 
 
“Where a directive is transposed belatedly, the date on 
which the national implementing measures actually enter 
into force in the Member State concerned does not consti-
tute the relevant point in time. Such a solution would be 
liable seriously to jeopardize the full effectiveness of 
Community law and its uniform application by means, in 
particular, of directives.”45 
 
Accordingly, the obligation of conforming interpretation has 
a certain priority over other “traditional” methods of interpre-
tation following the implementation deadline, because if 
conforming interpretation were ignored, the special legal 
features of EU law (primacy, direct effect, and non-
compliance procedure) will otherwise “enforce” the true 
objectives of the norm in question. Accepting that the di-
rective (or FD) influences the interpretation of national law 
before the expiration of the implementation deadline, it shall 
be pointed out that the obligation is only to consider the con-
tent of the directive already at the time when Member States 
legislature is already in motion with regard to implementa-
tion.46 
 
5. Changing Interpretation and Lex Praevia? 
The application of any norm requires judicial interpretation 
of the legal text. The application of codified penal provisions 
requires interpretation to reveal and formulate the immanent 
meaning of the legal norm (ratio legis). There is no applica-
                                                 
44
 ECJ, Judgment of 4.7.2006 – C-212/04 (Konstantinos 
Adeneler and Others vs. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos 
[ELOG]), ECR I-6057, p. 121 ff. 
45
 ECJ, Judgment of 4.7.2006 – C-212/04 (Konstantinos 
Adeneler and Others vs. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos 
[ELOG]), ECR I-6057, p. 116 (Adeneler). 
46
 Partly similarly, see Auer, NJW 2007, 1109. 
tion of a statute without prior interpretation. Since the word-
ing of a legal norm determines the scope of its applicability, 
questions concerning interpretation and the principle of legal-
ity arise. There are many ways to interpret criminal law and 
the legality principle sets the boundaries for any such inter-
pretation: judicial discretion in analyzing ratio legis may not 
be detrimental to the person subjected to the judicial process. 
The case of changing interpretation (e.g. when diverging 
practices followed by different local courts unified by deci-
sions of a higher court or of a constitutional court or by judi-
cial reflection to changing societal values) is a delicate one. 
In such a setting, a question regarding the non-retroactivity of 
unfavorable criminal law and relevant judicial interpretation 
must be answered. When the result of the new interpretation 
unfavorably affects the persons in the justice system, there is 
a real collision between principle and interpretation. It is 
therefore important to see that legality does require the rejec-
tion of detrimental “content” in the norm; although not based 
on the rationale of the prohibition of retroactivity, but be-
cause a new law has not been issued. The real grounds for 
refusal shall be based on the principle of lex stricta, meaning 
that the judge cannot establish a broader scope of criminal 
responsibility than as is prescribed by law. In the particular 
case where the text of the norm allows for both narrow (for-
mer) and broad (new) interpretations (without these being 
contra legem), then legality is not affected and the application 
of the law with the new “content” is justified.47 
 
6. Consequences for Criminal Law 
Because under legal interpretation the limitations of criminal 
responsibility may be extended, and considering that EU 
legislation provides for indirect effect – which may have an 
effect on Member States judicial legal interpretation activities 
–, the question legitimately as to whether retroactively effec-
tive adverse legal interpretation in this unique legal constella-
tion is precluded by the principle of legality arises. In the 
legal constellations that are the subject of the investigation, a 
criminal procedure is before a Member States court for a 
criminal act for which the EU has issued a legally approxi-
mating framework decision, but the deadline for its transposi-
tion has not yet expired. 
In relation to conforming interpretation, the core issue is: 
what are the requirements that flow from lex praevia, and 
from the prohibition of unfavorable retroactive criminal law? 
The context we are moving in is the following: 
 
 (i) the national criminal court tries an offence with al-
ready – at least partially – harmonized statutory ele-
ments48; and 
                                                 
47
 See Lenckner/Eser/Stree/Eisele/Heine/Perron/ Sternberg-
Lieben (fn. 27), § 2 para. 7, for more details on the German 
doctrine. 
48
 The terms “harmonized offence” and “harmonized statuto-
ry elements” are used for criminal law norms of a Member 
States that were influenced by EU law (through either a di-
rective or a framework decision). 
Krisztina Karsai 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ZIS 1/2016 
34 
 (ii) the national legislator is bound to implement the EU 
law norm into the domestic legal order. 
 
Legality (nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege praevia) pre-
scribes the application of the law in force and effect at the 
time of perpetration, and the relevant rule of lex mitior allows 
for the application of newer provisions, if such application 
would result in a favorable outcome for the offender. Appli-
cable law does not matter in this scenario; because national 
law shall be applied (the direct application of any European 
norm is not open), but then the question arises of how to take 
any directive or framework decision that might be in the 
“background” into consideration. EU law norms shall be 
taken into consideration in the interpretation of national law 
and the duty of conforming interpretation is binding from the 
date of publication of the EU law norm. 
In a temporal setting, there are five theoretic sub-
scenarios dependent both on the time of perpetration and of 
the judgment. A common feature of these scenarios is that 
domestic criminal law shall apply in adjudication; EU law 
does not intrude the texture of national law, but might have 
real impact via the duty of conforming interpretation. In all of 
these scenarios, I will examine whether directives or FD 
(accepted and implemented in the meantime) could ever lead 
to a more lenient content of national criminal law and wheth-
er the retroactivity of the newer laws can be applied. 
 
Scenario 149: The offense is committed at a time when the 
directive (or framework decision) has not yet been issued. 
The court shall decide before the expiration of the imple-
mentation deadline (p. 37). 
 
In this scenario, domestic law has not changed after perpetra-
tion, but there is already an EU law norm (i) which shall be 
implemented later than the time of the adjudication and (ii) 
which could have a substantive connection with the relevant 
norms of domestic criminal law. As suggested above, direc-
tives (FD) have a real impact on the jurisdiction of the Mem-
ber States before the implementation deadline expires. 
In this case, the judge has the following options: 
 
 a) s/he must interpret national law in accordance with the 
aims and justifications of the EU law norm, because the 
Member States cannot enforce “undesirable” legal norms 
if such enforcement would be in a (yet) contextual con-
tradiction with EU law. If this interpretation resulted in a 
more lenient content than the interpretation not taking in-
to account the indirect effect of the specific EU law norm, 
then the former shall be applied. In reaching a contradict-
ing conclusion, the decisive factor is that the offense was 
perpetrated before the issuance of the EU law norm, and 
the court cannot incorporate new “more rigorous content” 
in its interpretation because as of perpetration there was 
no such content available. 
 
                                                 
49
 C/UL norm = community law norm or union law norm. 
 b) if s/he is aware of the fact that there is a new law being 
enacted implementing the EU law norm or that a new 
domestic law will enter into force later on, and if the new 
law brings about changes in the scope of criminal respon-
sibility (or sanctioning), then s/he could wait for the entry 
into force of said new law. Obviously, this option is a 
vagabond one, but in the case of doubt in complicated 
cases, might lead to better outcomes. If the new domestic 
law implements the EU law norm properly, the lex prae-
via requirement can be incorporated in the adjudication 
without difficulty. 
 
It is necessary to remind ourselves that even if the EU law 
norm set forth minimum standards, more rigorous national 
criminal provisions do not lead to automatic contradiction 
with the EU law norm. 
 
Scenario 2: The time of perpetration is the same as in 
Scenario 1, but the court has to decide after the expiration 
of the implementation deadline (p. 38). 
 
In this scenario, b) (supra) is the only option the judge has 
since there is already a new law (or modification) in effect 
concerning the offence in question. 
If the implementation is not proper or the implementation 
deadline expired without transposition, the possibility of 
direct application opens. Finally, if the EU law norm cannot 
be applied directly, the “loyalty obligation” of the national 
court is activated in order to ensure the goals of the regulato-
ry schemes concerned until the national legislator issues the 
proper implementing norm. 
 
Scenario 3: In this scenario, both the perpetration and the 
decision take place within the “twilight zone”, i.e. when 
the EU law norm already exists, but the deadline for im-
plementation has not yet expired (p. 38). 
 
This scenario requires a resolution similar to that presented 
under Scenario 1, without taking into account the commis-
sion of the offence before the issuance of the EU law norm. 
 
Scenario 4: In this case the offence is perpetrated after the 
issuance of the EU law norm to be implemented, and the 
court shall decide after the expiration of the implementa-
tion deadline (p. 39). 
 
The fourth scenario is a simple one: there is a new domestic 
law implementing the EU law norm. If the new domestic law 
has properly implemented the EU law norm, the general 
commands of the lex praevia can be observed. It is not diffi-
cult to realize that proper implementation shall mean that the 
result of an eventual conforming interpretation before the 
implementation deadline expires (with regard to the time of 
perpetration) and the content of the new law shall overlap 
with one another. It can be taken for granted that if the im-
plementation is not proper or the deadline has expired with-
out transposition, the same consequences arise as mentioned 
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under Scenario 2 (i.e. the loyalty obligation of the national 
courts is triggered). 
 
Scenario 5: The clearest scenario is the last one: both the 
perpetration and the adjudication follow the expiration of 
the implementation deadline (p. 39). 
 
In this case the influence of EU law norm on national crimi-
nal law can be enforced only in the case of a failure to im-
plement or in the case of improper implementation. 
 
7. The Berlusconi Case 
As the Berlusconi case, in 2005, hit the fan of European news 
media, it became clear that there is another modality of tem-
poral changing criminal law governed by the interaction of 
legality and the process of European legal integration. 
 
Scenario Berlusconi: The Berlusconi-case brought partic-
ular attention to this very special modality: How the law 
should react if criminal law has already been rendered 
compatible with the relevant directive (that is, if the statu-
tory regulation of the offense or the punishment in ques-
tion is harmonized) at one point, but then it was changed 
after the perpetration and the new law is not in conformity 
with the relevant EU law norm (p. 39). 
 
In this case, if the former norm was more lenient, the en-
forcement of lex praevia is unobstructed, as well as the appli-
cation of the law in force at the time of the perpetration. 
Nonetheless, under the Berlusconi Scenario, that was not the 
case: the new provisions of the Italian regulation of criminal 
responsibility were more lenient than the former rules which 
rendered applicable a manifestly more rigorous punishment, 
and which were in force at the time when the prosecuted 
criminal acts were committed. 
In order to learn about the case, the following analysis 
shall be laid out: The first question is: what is the law appli-
cable to the offense at hand here? National criminal law con-
tains harmonized offenses (due to the EU law norm) and the 
temporal dimension of legality prescribes that new laws can 
be applied if they are more lenient than the applicable law 
governing adjudication of the case at hand. However, doubts 
surfaced as some held that the implementation of the EU law 
norm was improper; and therefore violates EU law and the 
application of the transposing norm, and thus, should be 
blocked. In case we affirm this assertion, the application of 
the harmonized statutory offense will be at risk and it would 
result in a knock-on effect on the relevant rule of lex mitior. 
It shall be recognized that it is not insignificant who submits 
such claims of improper implementation and what is the 
subject of such claims, e.g. whether is it in favor of the indi-
vidual (defendant) or it is rather unfavorable regarding 
his/her status. According to well-established ECJ case law, 
reliance on (i.e. claiming) improper implementation is al-
lowed only for the individuals; Member States authorities or 
the Member States itself are not entitled to rely on admitting 
legislative omissions against the defendant. Even in this case, 
only EU law norms with a possible favorable effect can claim 
to have been improperly implemented. In Berlusconi, the 
claim was submitted by the public prosecutor; therefore the 
ECJ was not compelled to test impropriety. 
“[I]t is, however, unnecessary to resolve that question for 
the purpose of the disputes in the main proceedings as the 
Community rule in issue is contained in a directive on 
which the law-enforcement authorities have relied against 
individuals within the context of criminal proceedings.”50 
 
In order to close the remaining gaps, it is necessary to make a 
further remark: in case a claim is admissible, the next level of 
analysis is the issue of direct application: if the EU law norm 
affected by the claim can be applied directly, the national 
court shall apply it in such a manner as part of its obligations 
under EU law. 
In summation of the legal arguments, the following shall 
be added, as the ECJ held: 
 
“[…] should the national courts conclude that the new law 
does not satisfy the Community law requirement that 
penalties be appropriate, it would follow, that the national 
court would be required to set aside, under their own au-
thority, those new articles without having to request or 
await the prior repeal of those articles by way of legisla-
tion or any other constitutional procedure.51” 
 
This means that the domestic court shall test the propriety of 
implementation and in the case of a negative outcome, the 
national legislator shall be compelled to comply with its 
obligations under EU law. Otherwise, the Union itself is well 
within its rights to enforce the proper implementation via a 
non-compliance procedure initiated against the Member 
States in violation of its obligations. 
In the case at hand, under the Berlusconi Scenario, more 
lenient criminal law was applied against the defendant who 
was a public figure. Regardless, the ECJ did not answer the 
question as to whether the principle of the retroactive applica-
tion of the more lenient punishment applies to the case, in 
which such punishment is at variance with other rules of 
Community law. It can be argued that the codification of the 
legality principle in the CFR creates a special constitutional 
safeguard. However, no details are elaborated herein, since 
the facets of this special safeguard will be shaped in the fu-
ture. 
 
V. Summary 
Legality is a conductive force on both the European and the 
national levels. “Codification” – in the CFR – of the principle 
at the European level is indeed an important new develop-
ment. Through the CFR, the principle was attributed a special 
constitutional character besides being a general principle of 
EU law. 
The original limitations of ius puniendi uncovered herein 
make for a special case in terms of enforcing legality in do-
                                                 
50
 Ibid. fn. 25 – Berlusconi, p. 71. 
51
 See inter alia ECJ – Case 106/77 (Simmenthal), ECR 1978, 
629, No. 21. 
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mestic criminal law: the interference between national crimi-
nal law and EU law norms could lead to a special constella-
tion, where the relevant norm is to be disregarded in the ap-
plication of the law, despite its legal force and existence. 
The prerequisites arising from the fact that EU law norms 
can simultaneously be considered as sources of criminal law 
constitute for the courts an obligation of conforming interpre-
tation, although this obligation shall also respect legality as 
defined under national law. 
However, to this date, it remains unclear whether legality 
has primacy in case of its collision with other EU law norms.  
From a theoretic standpoint, the argument can be made 
that granting “true” ius puniendi to the European legislator 
could lead to a changing concept as regards the “limitations” 
of EU law norms with criminal law content, by intruding 
upon national criminal law systems. If the European ius pu-
niendi is once acknowledged, the exclusion of establishing 
criminal responsibility in a Member States based solely on 
EU law norms shall be abolished. 
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Table 1 
Minimum content governed 
in EU sources of law  
MS legislation not 
harmonized by the 
agreed deadline 
Consequences Legal reasoning 
the positive elements of 
criminal responsibility1 
less stringent2 no indirect effect  internal limitation of indi-
rect effect of the directive3 
more stringent no indirect effect characteristic of minimum 
regulation  
the negative elements of 
criminal responsibility4 
less stringent5 no indirect effect internal limitation of indi-
rect effect of the directive6 
more stringent no indirect effect characteristic of minimum 
regulation 
explicit criminalization 
prohibition7 
 
more stringent indirect effect the conditions of indirect 
effect are met 
transfer to MS discretion 
(factors aggravating or mit-
igating responsibility)  
(not relevant) no indirect effect directive  
 
Scenario 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 E.g. more criminal conduct. 
2
 E.g. the given criminal conduct is not punishable. 
3
 The claim would establish or would increase criminal responsibility, thus the state would claim this at the detriment of the 
individual. 
4
 E.g. defining reasons for exclusion of illegality, in the case of illicit goods, establishing minimum boundaries and other factu-
al element limitations. 
5
 E.g. the conditions for exclusion of illegality are of a wider scope. 
6
 The claim would establish or would increase criminal responsibility, thus the state would claim this at the detriment of the 
individual. 
7
 I currently do not know of such directive provision. 
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Scenario 2 
 
 
Scenario 3 
 
 
Scenario 4 
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Scenario 5 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Berlusconi 
 
